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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (hereinafter SSCI) released an unclassified, but 
heavily redacted, report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(hereinafter CIA) Interrogation and Detention Program. The 
details of the report revealed a concentrated effort by CIA 
officials and private contractors to conduct unauthorized and 
illegal interrogation tactics on detainees deemed to be of 
intelligence value. The report explains in graphic and lurid 
detail the enhanced interrogation techniques used by private 
military contractors that amount to inhumane forms of torture 
and abuse. Under the program, the CIA effectively outsourced 
its interrogation program to a private military corporation under 
the pseudonym ‘Company Y’ as CIA officials continually shuffled 
detainees through different “Black Sites”1 throughout the world 
                                                          
1  See Jane  Mayer, The Black Sites, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46; 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantanamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006 (describing “black sites” as secret CIA installations 
designed to escape the reach of domestic law). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
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in order to evade the reach of U.S. law. This analysis seeks to 
argue that ‘Company Y’ is responsible for its role in the use of 
inhumane and tortious interrogation techniques during the 
CIA’s Interrogation and Detention Program under the Alien 
Tort Statute. Furthermore, this analysis will seek to reconcile 
case law in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et. al.2, and subsequent court 
decisions opining on the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort 
Statute. Significantly, this analysis will also answer questions 
left open in the Kiobel decision by arguing that corporate 
entities, such as Company Y, may be held liable in U.S. courts 
for violations of international law. Although the Kiobel decision 
strongly indicated that corporate liability may attach under the 
Alien Tort Statute (hereinafter ATS) if there is a sufficient nexus 
to the United States, the court ultimately left open two questions 
of law: (1) whether corporations could be liable for tortious 
conduct under the ATS, and, if so, (2) under what circumstances 
the ATS could apply to conduct occurring outside the geographic 
territory of the United States. Notably, circuit courts disagree as 
to whether corporate liability exists under international law, 
and, if it does, how to determine whether such liability results 
in a colorable ATS claim. Lastly, this analysis will determine the 
extent to which a plaintiff could hold Company Y liable for 
tortious conduct occurring in territories outside the United 
States under the ATS. 
I.  OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE 
A. Defining Customary International Law, The Law of 
Nations, and jus cogens Norms 
The intersection of jus cogens norms, Customary Practice, 
and International Corporate Liability are critical to the issue of 
whether a private military corporation can be held liable for a 
violation of jus cogens or customary international law under the 
ATS. Therefore, in order to fully appreciate the breadth of this 
analysis, we must first operationally define some core 
                                                          
2  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) [hereinafter 
Kiobel II]. 
3
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international and domestic legal principles.  The term jus cogens 
references a specific set of international norms that are so 
fundamental and integral to international law that a nation may 
not violate them under any circumstances. Unlike rules created 
by customary practice, a declaration or treaty will not refute the 
imposition of the norm upon a state. These norms are not always 
codified, but the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”) specifically acknowledges them.  Article 52 of the 
VCLT defines jus cogens as “a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted.”3 Examples of these norms 
include acts such as “trade in slaves, piracy or genocide . . . [and] 
treaties violating human rights.”4 Moreover, jus cogens 
violations go beyond individual liability of the perpetrator. The 
ILC Draft Articles on The Responsibility of States for Wrongful 
Conduct, as well as various international tribunals impute 
liability for violations of these norms upon the state itself when 
an “organ” of the state is the perpetrator.5 International 
Conventions codifying certain jus cogens such as the Torture 
Convention and the Genocide Convention both impose liability 
of these violations extraterritorially since they are not just 
violations of an individual, but violations against the 
international community as a whole.6 
                                                          
3  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) 
and 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 875 (1969) (Although the United States has not ratified 
the Vienna Convention, the United States considers many of the treaty’s 
provisions as customary international law). 
4  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Commentaries, Chapter III, at n. 641, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see also id. at art. 40, ¶¶ 4-6 (citing 
examples of jus cogens norms as the prohibition of aggressive wars, slavery and 
the slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination and apartheid, torture, the 
basic rules of international humanitarian law as applied to the law of armed 
conflict, and the principle of self-determination). 
5  Id. at art. 4(2); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter 
Nicaragua v. United States]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Hertz v. Serb. & Mont.) 
(Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia]; Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶123 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic]. 
6  Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
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Customary International Law refers to a regime of 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law” which constitutes evidence of a customary rule.7 
Although this regime is not codified or considered as so 
fundamental and general to be considered a jus cogens norm, 
states adhere to these rules as a matter of opinio juris (belief 
that the rule or norm is legally binding) or opinio necessitates 
(state practice).8 In The Paquete Habana,9 the United States 
Supreme Court further defined customary law by holding that it 
is the “customs and usages of civilized nations” evidenced by 
works of jurists and commentators who have garnered 
significant expertise in the subject matter of international law.10 
Notably, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that 
when such a practice rises to the level of “Customary Practice,” 
then it is binding upon all Nation States.11 Although it is difficult 
to ascertain a precise definition of what constitutes sufficient 
state practice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadic, provides guidance by 
stating 
. . . appraising the formation of customary rules or general 
principles one should therefore be aware that, on the account of 
the inherent nature of this subject matter, reliance must be 
primarily placed on such elements as official pronouncements of 
States, military manuals and judicial decisions.12 
These articulations of Customary International Law 
emphasize the difficulty in ascertaining a precise definition of at 
                                                          
U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 149 ¶¶ 13-15; see also Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 5, 7, Dec. 
10, 1984, 1456 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 49, 50, 129, 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.  In the U.S., the Torture Victim Protection Act 
is an example of national legislation providing such form of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (see infra Section IV.B). 
7  Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties, 3 (1985). 
8  Art. 38(1)(b) I.C.J. Statute, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 
993. 
9  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
10  Id. 
11  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Neth.), 1968 
I.C.J., ¶¶ 37-38 (Apr. 26 1968) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Cases]. 
12  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule,” Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 
¶123 Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (July 15, 1999). 
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what point a practice becomes binding custom.13 However, each 
of these definitions parallel a workable approach best 
articulated by the Restatement Third which describes 
customary law “as resulting from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”14 Thus, no precise timetable is set for when a custom 
achieves legal status; the Commentaries on the Restatement 
contend that a practice can often achieve customary law status 
within a short period of time through international acceptance 
of its legality.15 
B.  International and Domestic Prohibition Against Torture 
The actions of Company Y, which with the CIA, include 
heinous violations of customary international law. Numerous 
reports by public entities and non-governmental organizations 
have documented the torture and abuse conducted on detainees 
within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention program.16 
Importantly, international condemnation of torture has been 
recognized since before the mid-1900’s, and formal prohibition of 
torture has been codified as customary international law in 
various international tribunals.17 Federal courts recognize the 
                                                          
13  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
§102, 702 (1987) (hereinafter “Restatement”). 
14 Restatement § 102(2). 
15 Restatement § 102 comment a; see also,  North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 71, 73– 74 (Feb. 20). 
16  This analysis includes only brief summations of the type of heinous 
violations inflicted upon detainees within the CIA’s Interrogation and 
Detention program. For a detailed account of these violations see generally, 
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (S. Rept. 114-8) 
Washington, Government Printing Office, 2015 [hereinafter SSCI Report]; see 
generally Amnesty International, USA Crimes and Impunity: Full Senate 
Committee Report On CIA Secret Detentions Must Be Released, And 
Accountability For Crimes Under International Law Ensured, London (Apr. 
2015), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/cia_torture_report_amr_511432
2015.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l Report]. 
17  See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American 
Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; see also Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
255; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule,” Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
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international prohibition against torture and have continually 
reinforced its status as customary international law.18 Although 
corporations are not liable under the Torture Convention,19 
corporations are nevertheless liable under other statutes and 
common law remedies for torture, as this analysis will further 
develop.20 
C. The History of the ATS and its Application in U.S. Courts 
In 1789, Congress enacted Section 9 of the First Judiciary 
Act. This provision provided, among other things, that federal 
jurisdiction shall have “cognizance, concurrent with the courts 
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of 
all causes of action where an alien sues for a tort only in violation 
                                                          
the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 65–74 (Aug. 10, 1995). 
18  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, (2004) (“[F]or purposes of 
civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before 
him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”) citing Filartiga v. 
Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture “violates universally 
accepted norms of the international law of human rights); Siderman de Blake 
v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992) (international 
prohibition against torture is undisputed); Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102, (1987) (Torture is an 
international crime and the prohibition against torture constitutes a jus 
cogens norm). 
19  See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012). 
20  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (ratified by 
the United States on June 8, 1992); Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 
S. Treaty Doc. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT] (ratified by 
the United States on Oct. 21, 1994); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 3, 13, 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (ratified by the United States on Aug. 2, 
1955); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, arts. 3, 32, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter GC IV] (ratified by the United States on Aug. 2, 1955); see also 
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc. 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that corporations may be liable under the ATS for torture); Mwani v. Al Qaeda, 
No. CV 99-125 (JMF), 2014 WL 4749182, at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (holding 
that ATS jurisdiction is “best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action.” 
Therefore, federal courts may “recognize private claims [for such violations] 
under federal common law”). 
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of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States.”21 While 
Congress has modified this provision over time, it is presently 
recognized as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).22 Although there is 
little legislative history available for the ATS, its inclusion in the 
First Judiciary Act strongly indicates that the fledgling United 
States sought to alleviate concerns that it would not be able to 
uphold its treaty obligations.23 Prior to the 1980s, the ATS had 
been rarely litigated. The first two cases occurred in the late 18th 
century and dealt primarily with admiralty cases.24 The statute 
was once against invoked in O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke25 
dealing with the U.S. occupation of Cuba, but remained virtually 
dormant for almost one hundred years thereafter. 
In 1980, the ATS was revived in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.26 
The Filartiga case centered around alleged violations of 
international customary law that occurred overseas in the 
Republic of Paraguay. The plaintiff alleged that Peña-Irala, the 
defendant, kidnapped, tortured, and murdered her brother 
while he was serving as Inspector General of the Paraguyan 
police force in Paraguay in violation of the law of nations.27 The 
                                                          
21  Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
22  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115-17 (2d Cir. 
2010) [hereinafter Kiobel] (noting that after its passage by the first Congress 
in 1789, the ATS laid largely dormant for over 170 years,” and relating the 
subsequent interpretation of the ATS by courts), aff’d, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671, 81 U.S.L.W. 4241 (2013). 
23  Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal 
Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort 
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 13 (1985); Thomas B. Harvey, Wrapping 
Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military 
Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 247, 262 (2008). 
24  See Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9, 895) (D.C. Pa. 1793); 
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). 
25  O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908). 
26  Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Minor court decisions dealt with 
ATS claims prior to Filartiga, but the Filartiga decision became a key 
precedent in the evolution of the ATS. For prior application of the ATS in the 
20th century, see Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d 
Cir. 1978); Huyn Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). 
27  Id. at 878-79 (Filartiga alleged that Peña-Irala violated the U. N. 
Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U. N. Declaration 
Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 
and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the 
customary international law of human rights and the law of nations.); 
Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
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Second Circuit concluded that the law of nations was to be 
interpreted as a “constantly evolving” body of law rather than a 
static sphere of rights.28 Moreover, the court held that ATS did 
not create new rights, but rather conferred upon the courts the 
right to adjudicate “rights already recognized by international 
law.”29 Based upon this analysis, the court concluded that 
torture was a violation of the law of nations, and further that the 
ATS conferred jurisdiction to examine violations occurring 
outside the territory of the United States where there was 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.30 Filartiga launched a 
new wave of ATS litigation in U.S. Courts and opened the door 
to a new wave of ATS litigation that forced numerous courts to 
wrestle with issues of jurisdiction, international treaties, and 
violations of jus cogens and customary international law. 
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to clarify the scope of the ATS.31 The Supreme Court 
held that Congress enacted the ATS to be actionable and have a 
“practical effect” in federal courts32, and “meant to underwrite 
litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the 
law of nations.”33 Although the type of violations actionable 
under the ATS are limited, “Congress did not pass the ATS as a 
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a 
future Congress or state legislature that might, someday, 
authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make 
some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of 
foreigners.”34 
D. The Kiobel Complaint and Supreme Court Decisions 
The Kiobel decisions heavily influence the outcome of a 
potential ATS claim against Company Y. In Kiobel,35 the 
plaintiffs filed an ATS suit against Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
Shell Transport & Trading Co., Plc, and its wholly owned 
                                                          
28  Id. at 885. 
29  Id. at 886. 
30  Id. 
31  Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 699. 
32  Id. at 719. 
33  Id. at 721. 
34  Id. at 719. 
35  Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111. 
9
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subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Ltd.36 The plaintiffs alleged that respondents contracted with 
the Nigerian government to eliminate opposition to oil fields in 
Nigerian villages by extrajudicial killings, unlawful arrest, 
torture, and other violations of customary international law. The 
petitioners also alleged that the respondents aided and abetted 
the Nigerian government in committing these acts by providing 
logistical support to the Nigerian military, including food, 
transportation, and allow use of respondent’s property in order 
for the Nigerian military to stage their attacks. The Second 
Circuit held that since customary international law determines 
the scope of liability under the ATS,37 the court must also 
examine whether civil liability against corporations existed as 
customary international law. According to the second circuit, in 
order for a norm to become a rule of customary international law 
it must be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”38 The court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint against the corporate 
defendants, holding that corporate liability has not risen to the 
level of customary international law because there were only a 
few historical examples and treaties that provided for such 
liability.39 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court on the issue 
of international corporate liability. However, the Supreme Court 
ordered briefing on whether the Alien Tort Statute applied to 
extraterritorial conduct beyond the jurisdiction of the United 
States. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.40 The plaintiffs 
subsequently argued that jurisdiction was proper under the ATS 
because the respondents held corporate parents within the 
United States.41 In Kiobel II, the court held that in order for 
jurisdiction to arise under the Alien Tort Statute, the alleged 
violations must sufficiently “touch and concern” the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.42 In this regard, 
                                                          
36  Id. at 123. 
37  Id. at 128. 
38  Id. at 131. 
39  Id. at 145. 
40  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kiobel I]. 
41  Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
42  Id. at 1673. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
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mere corporate presence alone was not a sufficient basis for 
application of the Alien Tort Statute and the court dismissed the 
complaint.43 
Significantly, the Kiobel II, left two important questions of 
law unanswered. First, the Supreme Court did not definitively 
rule on the issue of international corporate liability and whether 
entities such as Company Y can be held liable for violations 
under the Alien Tort Statute.  Secondly, the Kiobel II decision 
failed to precisely articulate under what circumstances the 
presumption against extraterritoriality may be displaced under 
the ATS. Instead, the Kiobel II court left for “another day the 
determination of just when the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might be overcome.”44 This analysis seeks to 
affirmatively answer these two questions, and will do so in a 
manner that persuasively allows a claim against Company Y to 
be brought under the Alien Tort Statute. 
II. CORPORATE LIABILITY AND KIOBEL’S SEARCH FOR 
ATTRIBUTING LIABILITY TO A CORPORATE 
DEFENDANT 
“Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls 
to be condemned; they therefore do as they like.”  
 – Edward Thurlow, 1st Baron Thurlow. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.,45 [hereinafter Kiobel II] left open fundamental 
questions regarding the liability of corporations under the Alien 
Tort Statute [hereinafter ATS].46 Significantly, the Supreme 
Court did not answer the question left open in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.,47 [hereinafter Kiobel I] of whether 
corporations could be liable for violations of customary 
international law under the ATS. In order to hold the Central 
Intelligence Agency corporate contractors liable for their 
violations of customary law, the principle of corporate liability 
must be addressed. Accordingly, part III of this analysis will 
                                                          
43  Id. at 1669. 
44  Id. at 1673. (Breyer J., concurring). 
45  Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. (2013). 
46  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
47  Kiobel I, 132 S. Ct. (2012). 
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demonstrate that corporations could be held liable for violations 
of customary norms in international law under the ATS. Thus, 
much to the chagrin of the Lord Chancellor Thurlow, 
corporations may be soulless legal entities, but they are not 
immune from the consequences of their tortious conduct. 
A. International principles holding Corporations liable for 
tortious acts 
It is an unquestionable fact that international tribunals and 
courts have held corporations liable for violations of customary 
and jus cogens norms. In fact, basic principles of international 
law demand that corporations must be held liable for violations 
of the law. A fundamental bedrock of international law is that 
an aggrieved party has a right to an effective remedy.48 This 
right is established by virtually every major human rights 
accord.49 Numerous international tribunals and treaties 
specifically attach corporate liability for tortious conduct and the 
wide recognition of corporate liability has elevated this principle 
to the status of customary international law. The question of 
international corporate liability first received significant 
attention within the Second Circuit. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated “no 
international tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a 
corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations.50 However, 
this assertion has been greatly criticized by scholars and other 
courts. 
                                                          
48  Factory At Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29, 
(Sept. 13). 
49  See UDHR, supra note 18, at art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an 
effective remedy . . . for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him . . . 
.”); see also id. at art. 14; ICCPR, supra note 18, arts. 2(3), 9(5), 14(6) (ensuring 
remedies and compensation for wrongful convictions and imprisonment); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 6, 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“State Parties shall assure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies”); see also Int’l Comm’n of 
Jurists, Written Statement to the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Disability Rights 
Convention, Need for an Effective Domestic Remedy in the Disability Rights 
Convention, Jan. 2005, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ 
ahc5docs/ahc5icj.rtf. (“The right to an effective remedy is so firmly 
enshrined . . . that any credible modern human rights treaty has to incorporate 
it.”). 
50  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132. 
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A number of domestic courts are vehemently critical of the 
assertion that international law does not proscribe corporate 
liability. In Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, the 
Seventh Circuit explicitly stated “[t]he factual premise of the 
majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.”51 Moreover, in 
In re S. African Apartheid Litig., the district court also 
questioned the validity of the Kiobel’s assertion, and explicitly 
stated that “the court’s conclusion that customary international 
law does not recognize [corporate liability] is factually and 
legally incorrect.”52 In fact, scholars and judges point to a 
number of international tribunal decisions, including the very 
same tribunal cited by the Kiobel court to demonstrate that 
corporations are liable for customary international law and jus 
cogens violations. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the international 
community sought to bring each perpetrator of the heinous 
humanitarian violations and war crimes to justice. The swift 
force of justice that ensued after World War II was not only 
directed at individuals, but also towards corporations and other 
financial institutions that played a part in facilitating the 
atrocities that occurred in Germany.  While historians correctly 
assert that only individuals were tried at the Nuremberg 
Trials,53 it does not follow that no corporation was ever held 
accountable for their role in those atrocities. For instance, in the 
judgments against executives of IG Farbenindustrie and Krupp, 
the court specifically admonished two corporations for their role 
in violating international law by stating: 
We conclude from the credible evidence before us that the 
confiscation of the Austin plant based upon German-inspired anti-
Jewish laws and its subsequent detention by the Krupp firm 
constitute a violation of Article 48 of the Hague Regulations which 
requires that the laws in force in an occupied country be respected; 
that it was also a violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations 
                                                          
51  Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
52  In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 15 F.Supp.3d 454, 464 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
17, 2014). 
53  Brief Amici Curiae of Nuremberg Historians and International 
Lawyers in Support of Neither Party, at 10; Kiobel I, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) 
(arguing that Corporate officers, but not the corporation itself was tried at 
Nuremberg). 
13
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which provides that private property must be respected; that the 
Krupp firm, through defendants . . . voluntarily and without 
duress participated in these violations . . .  and that there was no 
justification for such action.54 
Moreover, in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, the 
court cited to the Allied Control Council Laws ordering the 
liquidation of assets of corporations found to assist the Nazi war 
crimes.55 Consequently, the lack of corporate prosecution at 
Nuremberg stemmed not from a void of international law, but 
rather a recognition by Allied policy makers that “political and 
economic stability [in Germany after World War II] could only 
be achieved with the participation of German industry run by 
the same managers, regardless of culpability.”56 In spite of this, 
corporate liability as customary international law is not 
dependent on the authority of international tribunals. Instead, 
the norm exists separate and apart from an adjudicator. 
An anchored reliance on international tribunals to 
determine what actions constitute customary international law 
is largely untenable and contradicts the essence of customary 
international law. Customary International law is not defined 
by decisions of international tribunals, rather it exists 
independent of tribunals and is applied to specific facts 
examined by those tribunals.57 It is significant to note that 
                                                          
54  United States v. Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1351-52 
(1952). 
55  Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017; In re S. African Apartheid Litig., at 465; see 
also Control Council Law No. 2, “Providing for the Termination and 
Liquidation of the Nazi Organizations,” Oct. 10, 1945, reprinted in 1 
Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating 
Committee 131 (1945); Control Council Law No. 9, “Providing for the Seizure 
of Property Owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof,” Nov. 30, 
1945, reprinted in 1 Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council 
and Coordinating Committee 225, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf (last visited 
Mar 13, 2015). 
56  Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in 
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1094, 1121 (2009). 
57  Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017 (holding that norms and remedies for 
customary norms are not created by international tribunals but instead, only 
enforced by them); see also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: 
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 476 (2001) (stating that 
“the presence of a court holding a state responsible has never been the linchpin 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
4  DAVID J  SATNARINE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2016  3:53 PM 
2016] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 175 
customary international law is not necessarily predicated on the 
practice between states, but instead, recognized as the practice 
of states.58  Moreover, since no precise timeline is necessary for 
a norm to be deemed “custom,” a practice can develop into a 
custom in a relatively short period of time if a sufficient number 
of states embrace that norm as a legal responsibility.59 The 
International Court of Justice has opined on this very fact, and 
held that the ‘widespread and representative’ adoption of a 
conventional/treaty rule by non-signatory states, coupled with 
only the passage of a ‘short period’ of time, was all that was 
required to transform conventional international law into 
customary international law.”60 Accordingly, it is state practice 
and their opinion juris (official pronouncements) that 
demonstrate whether corporate liability exists as a customary 
norm.61 
State practice and their official pronouncements 
demonstrate that corporate liability is a customary norm. 
Instructively, the United States Supreme Court held that 
federal courts should recognize claim “based on the present-day 
law of nations if those claims rest on norm[s] of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century 
paradigms.”62 Accordingly, the principle of corporate liability is 
firmly rooted in the customary norm of holding actors 
responsible for their violations of the law. Fist, virtually every 
legal system holds corporations liable for their actions.63 In fact, 
                                                          
of the obligation itself.”). 
58  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases at ¶¶ 37-38; Statute of the I.C.J. 
art. 38; see also Restatement (Third) Of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, sections 102, 702 (1987); Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary 
International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, EUR. 
J ‘L INT’L Int. L.  21, 173-204, 180 (2010). 
59  Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st 
Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, EUR. J. INT’L L.  21, 173-204, 180 
(2010). 
60  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases at ¶ 41. 
61  See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] 
(Customary international law is the law of civilized nations). 
62  Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 725 (2004) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
63  See First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de 
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 628-29, n.20 (1983); see also Exxon, 654 F.3d at 53 (holding 
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many nations have reached further than civil liability for 
corporations and have adopted domestic laws that proscribe both 
civil and criminal liability on corporations.64 Accordingly, the 
widely universal practice of corporate liability in nation states 
demonstrates the requisite state practice element of a customary 
norm. Secondly, the majority of nations have embraced 
international corporate liability through treaties, United 
Nations Resolutions, and international accords.65 For example, 
numerous treaties related to environmental law and pollution 
specifically impose liability on corporate actors.66 These 
obligations directly implicate a corporation’s responsibility 
under a web of legally binding international responsibilities. 
Moreover, the widespread adoption and ratification of the 
various environmental treaties indicate that corporations are 
not exempt from liability under international law. 
Even assuming arguendo that the ATS requires corporate 
liability to be established by international tribunals, a number 
of international tribunals have expressly held corporations 
liable for civil and criminal violations. In the Barcelona 
Traction case, the International Court of Justice explicitly held 
                                                          
that corporate liability is an essential element of “legal personhood.”); see also 
The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 38-
39 (Feb. 5) (holding that the “wealth of practice” across domestic legal systems 
hold corporations liable for torts such as fraud or malfeasance). 
64  See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal 
Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 130 (2008) (arguing that comparative regimes of 
corporate liability hold corporations liable for violations of law, including 
through administrative regulations and civil remedies); see also, Jodie A. 
Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational 
Corporations to Europe? Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort 
Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 283 (2012) (emphasizing the rise of 
criminal corporate responsibility in across the European Union and other 
countries); see, e.g., Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], CODE PENAL 
SUISSE [CP], CODICE PÉNAL SVIZZERO [CP] [PENAL CODE] 2003, SR 311, RS 311, 
art. 102 (Switz.) (Updating Switzerland’s Penal Code to include Criminal 
Liability for Corporations). 
65  See U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guides for the 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, ¶ 243 (2004) (discussing various 
international treaties and United Nations Resolutions pronouncing that 
corporations should be liable for tortious conduct). 
66  Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443, 480 (2001) (discussing several environmental 
treaties imposing liability on ship owners for environmental pollution). 
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that a corporation can be held civilly liable for their actions 
through a fundamental principles of international law – namely 
the right to an effective remedy.67 
Accordingly, the European Court of Justice has held 
corporations civilly liable for acts such as discrimination on the 
basis of nationality.68 In the criminal context, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) specifically examined whether it 
had authority to hold a corporation liable for obstruction of 
justice charges pursuant to its United Nations Security Council 
Mandate.69 The Lebanese International Tribunal held that “the 
principles of interpretation laid down in customary 
international. . . international standards on human rights [and] 
general principles of international criminal law and 
procedure . . . “ allowed the court to charge the corporate 
defendants with obstruction of justice.70 The cumulative breadth 
of these decisions demonstrates that international tribunals are 
increasingly likely to hold corporations liable for unlawful 
conduct in both the civil and criminal settings. Moreover, these 
cases also demonstrate that the distinction between “natural” 
and “legal” personhood is dissolved when international courts 
seek to enforce remedies for international violations. 
In light of the preceding, it is clear that the practice of the 
majority of civilized nations deems corporations liable for 
                                                          
67  The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 
3, 38-39 (Feb. 5); Chorzów Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, 
at 29 (Sept. 13) (“It is a principle of international law, and even a general 
conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation”); Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Hond., Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ¶¶ 62- 64 (July 21, 1989); see also 
Garrido & Baigorria v. Arg., Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶ 40 (Aug. 27, 1998); accord, Durand & Ugarte v. Peru, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 89, ¶ 24 
(Dec. 3, 2001) (“[A]ny violation of an international obligation carries with it the 
obligation to make adequate reparation.”); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-
XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 101. 
68  Case 36/74, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 
E.C.R. 1405, 1419, and gender; Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme 
Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 457-63. 
69  S.C. Res. 1664, S/RES/ 1664 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
70  Special Tribunal for Lebanon, In the Case against Akhbar Beirut 
S.A.L. and Al-Amin (Contempt Judge), Case No. STL-14-06/I/CJ, ¶ 20 (31 Jan. 
2014), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/filings-stl-
14-06/3091-f0001-1406. 
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unlawful conduct. Moreover, states have evidenced these legal 
commitments through international agreements and binding 
domestic law. These components demonstrate the two essential 
elements of a customary norm. International Tribunals have 
translated this norm into enforceable judgments against 
corporations, which imposes fines, liquidation, and regulatory 
action for a corporation’s tortious conduct. Thus, there is ample 
evidence of corporate liability in customary international law. 
B. Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute in 
Federal Common Law 
While it is axiomatic that corporations can be held liable 
violations of customary and jus cogens norms, the issue of 
whether liability can attributed to corporations under the Alien 
Tort Statute is less certain. In Kiobel I, the Supreme Court 
ordered briefing on the issue of international corporate 
liability.71 However, in Kiobel II, the court affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on other grounds.72 As 
a result, lower courts have struggled with the Supreme Court’s 
ambiguous holdings regarding corporate liability under the ATS. 
In spite of this, there is significant harmony among the federal 
circuit courts that corporations could be held liable under the 
ATS. Moreover, some scholars even argue that the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the existence of corporate liability under 
the ATS when it assumed jurisdiction over the corporate 
defendants in Kiobel II. Therefore, as this analysis will posit, the 
near unilateral consensus among the federal circuit courts 
demonstrate that corporate liability can be attributed to entities, 
such as military corporations under the ATS. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel II, the 
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had 
each decided that corporations could be held liable for law of 
nations violations under the ATS. In fact, prior to Kiobel II, only 
the Second Circuit had determined that corporations were 
immune from liability under ATS. However, since Kiobel II, 
district courts within the Second Circuit have revisited the issue 
and have definitively concluded that corporations could be held 
                                                          
71  Kiobel I, 132 S. Ct. at 1738. 
72  Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-69. 
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liable under the ATS. Therefore, the virtual unanimity among 
the courts that have addressed this issue establishes a clear rule 
of law that corporate defendants should be held liable for 
violations of customary and jus cogens norms. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,73 two circuit court opinions initially addressed the 
issue of corporate liability in international law. First, in Romero 
v. Drummond Co., Inc.,74 the corporate defendants could be held 
liable under the ATS since extrajudicial killings are a violation 
of the law of nations.75 Secondly, in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. 
Rubber Co., LLC, the plaintiffs alleged that Firestone Natural 
Rubber Company through its Liberian subsidiary that operated 
a rubber plantation in Liberia violated a number of customary 
and jus cogens norms, and brought an ATS suit against the U.S. 
parent company.76  The Flomo court held that corporate liability 
was not precluded under the ATS because international law has 
recognized principles of corporate liability.77 Moreover, the 
Flomo court argued that even assuming no international court 
has ever held a corporation liable for customary international 
law violations, there has to be a first time for a court to enforce 
a customary norm. To decide otherwise would eviscerate any 
possible future enforcement of a customary law violation.78 
Two other circuit courts also examined the issue of corporate 
liability issue under the ATS and reached similar conclusions on 
different grounds. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,79 the Ninth Circuit 
determined that examination of ATS claims required a two-step 
approach.80 First, a court should consider each violation of 
international law to determine whether the violation is 
sufficiently “specific, universal and obligatory.”81 Once a court 
determines that the alleged conduct violates a customary or jus 
cogens norm, federal common law allows the court to hold the 
                                                          
73  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542,U.S. 692 (2004). 
74  Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). 
75  Id. at 1316. 
76  Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017. 
77  Id. at 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). 
78  Id. at 1017. 
79  671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(2013). 
80  Id. at 748. 
81  Id. 
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actors and their employers responsible for the tortious conduct.82  
From this perspective, the remedies available for violations of 
customary or jus cogens norms are found in the federal common 
law.83  Additionally, the Sarei court found that not only could 
corporate defendants be liable for violations of customary or jus 
cogens norms, but that they could also be held liable for aiding 
and abetting liability through federal common law.84 Although 
the Sarei opinion was not the first Circuit decision to directly 
address corporate liability under the ATS, it was the first to 
examine the distinction between jurisdiction and federal 
common law liability under the ATS. 
The D.C. Circuit has also held that corporations could be 
liable under the ATS pursuant to federal common law. In Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp.,85 the plaintiffs alleged that foreign corporate 
subsidiaries of Exxon Mobil hired security forces that committed 
“murder, torture, sexual assault, battery and false 
imprisonment” against villagers in Indonesia.86 The plaintiffs 
also alleged that Exxon security forces comprised of Exxon 
employees and members of the Indonesian military, even though 
Exxon management was aware that the security forces 
committed heinous human rights abuses in the past. Moreover, 
the Doe complaint argued that the actions of the Indonesian 
military could be attributed to Exxon because the soldiers were 
comprised of a unit dedicated to securing Exxon’s facilities in the 
region and were subject to command and control by Exxon 
employees.87  In concluding that Exxon could be held liable 
under the ATS, the D.C. Circuit determined that “customary 
international law does not provide the rule” to determine 
whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS.88 
                                                          
82  Id. at 751. 
83  Id. at 752; see also Efrain Staino, Suing Private Military Contractors 
for Torture: How to Use the Alien Tort Statute Without Granting Sovereign 
Immunity-Related Defenses, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2010) 
(arguing that proper application of the Sosa precedent requires courts to 
provide Federal Common Law remedies to ATS violations). 
84  Id. 
85  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on 
other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
86  Id. at 16. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 41. 
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Instead, the issue of corporate liability under the ATS is distinct 
from whether a violation of a customary or jus cogens norm 
occurred. Accordingly, the court must look to the federal common 
law to determine the remedies available for ATS violations.89 
Therefore, the Doe court held that since the common law at the 
time of the passage of the ATS recognized corporate liability, 
congress therefore anticipated corporate liability as a remedy for 
an ATS violation.90 
The Second Circuit is the only Circuit Court to reach a 
different conclusion than others regarding corporate liability 
under the ATS.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel I, 
the Second Circuit initially addressed the question of corporate 
liability. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the court 
determined that corporations could not be held liable under the 
ATS.91 In reaching this conclusion, the stated: 
Our recognition of a norm of liability as a matter of domestic law, 
therefore, cannot create a norm of customary international law. In 
other words, the fact that corporations are liable as juridical 
persons under domestic law does not mean that they are liable 
under international law (and, therefore, under the ATS). 
Moreover, the fact that a legal norm is found in most or even all 
“civilized nations” does not make that norm a part of customary 
international law.92 
According to the court’s argument, a corporation can only be 
held liable under the ATS if corporate liability is a norm of 
customary international law.93  The court went on to conclude 
that international law recognized only individual liability for 
violations of international law, and since no corporation has ever 
been held liable for a violation of international law by an 
international tribunal, there is no customary norm of corporate 
liability.94 
Some courts within the second circuit have adopted the 
position that corporations are not liable under the ATS. For 
example, in Tymoshenko v. Firtash, the district court rejected 
                                                          
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 48. 
91  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 131. 
94  Id. at 119, 132. 
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the plaintiff’s argument that “because the Supreme Court did 
not expressly foreclose corporate liability, their ATS claim 
against [a corporate defendant] may proceed.”95 The 
Tymoshenko Court determined that it was bound by the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Kiobel regarding corporate liability under 
the ATS because neither the Supreme Court nor the Second 
Circuit has expressly decided the issue.96 Similarly, in Ahmad v. 
Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, another district court 
found that corporations are not liable under the ATS based on 
the Second Circuit’s Kiobel precedent.97 However, recent district 
court precedents within the Second Circuit have begun to adopt 
the holdings of their sister circuits regarding corporate 
liability.98 This development has created a growing discord 
within the second circuit regarding the Kiobel findings. As a 
result, subsequent Second Circuit decisions are vehemently 
critical of fundamental premises in Kiobel and have specifically 
refuted its findings.99 
The central holding of Kiobel is no longer binding within the 
second circuit. Other district courts within the Second Circuit 
have seriously questioned the fundamental reasoning of the 
Kiobel decision, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has 
indicated that it’s initial Kiobel decision is no longer binding 
within the Second Circuit. In Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese 
Canadian Bank, SAL,100 the Second Circuit remanded the issue 
of corporate liability under the ATS to the district court because 
“the Supreme Court’s opinion [in Kiobel II] did not directly 
address the question of corporate liability under the ATS.”101 
While the district court is yet to make a determination in Licci, 
two other second circuit district courts have explicitly held that 
corporations can be held liable under the ATS in light of the 
Kiobel I and II precedents. 
A number of District courts within the Second Circuit have 
                                                          
95 Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CIV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). 
96  Id. at 6 n.4. 
97  Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli Cmtys., No. 13-CIV-3376 (JMF), 
2014 WL 1796322, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
98  See notes 98-115 infra and supporting text. 
99  Id. 
100 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013). 
101  Id. at 174. 
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been reluctant to embrace the Circuit’s own Kiobel precedent. In, 
In Re: South African Apartheid Litigation,102 the Southern 
District of New York held that the Supreme Court’s decisions,103 
as well as the second circuit opinions in Licci and Chowdhury v. 
Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd.,104 significantly undermined 
the central holding of Kiobel – “that corporations cannot be held 
liable for claims brought under the ATS.” – and left the question 
open within the circuit.105  According to Apartheid Litigation, the 
Tymoshenko decision was reached prior to the Licci and 
Chowdhury decisions and relied exclusively on the Second 
Circuit’s Kiobel precedent.106 Therefore, Apartheid Litigation 
concluded that because Tymonshenko issue of corporate liability 
under the ATS was still an open question within the circuit.107 
The Apartheid Litigation opinion went on to significantly 
criticize the Second Circuit’s standing as an outlier among other 
courts in finding that no corporation has been held liable by an 
international tribunal and further, that corporations are 
immune from liability under the ATS. The Apartheid Litigation 
court stated that the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel not only 
failed to recognize corporate liability in international law, but 
also incorrectly conflated the issue of whether a tort violates a 
customary norm with the remedies available for that norm.108 As 
a result, Apartheid Litigation concluded that the ATS 
contemplated federal common law to govern what remedies were 
available for a violation of a customary or jus cogens norm, and 
further, that “nothing in the text, history or purposes of the ATS 
indicates that corporations are immune from liability on the 
basis of federal common law.”109 
Another district court within the second circuit also reached 
                                                          
102  15. F.Supp.3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Apartheid 
Litig.] 
103  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014); 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) 
104  746 F.3d 42, 57 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. 135 S. Ct. 401 (2014) 
105  Apartheid Litig., 15 F.Supp.3d at 460. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. at 461. 
108  Id. at 463 (noting that far “from implying that natural persons and 
corporations are treated differently for purposes of civil liability under the ATS, 
the [Sosa Court] intended . . . that they are treated identically”). 
109  Id. at 464. 
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the same conclusion. In Sikhs for Justice Inc. v. Indian Nat’l 
Cong. Party,110 the court also found that corporations could be 
liable for ATS violations.111 Similar to the Apartheid Litigation 
holding, the Sikhs for Justice Inc., decision significantly 
criticized the Second Circuit’s Kiobel decision and largely 
adopted the reasoning of the Apartheid Litigation.112 Moreover, 
Sikhs for Justice Inc. expressly held that “the Supreme Court’s 
recent opinions suggest that holding corporate defendants liable 
under the statute, assuming other jurisdictional requirements 
are met, is appropriate.”113 
As a result of these precedents, there is a growing consensus 
that the Kiobel holding is no longer binding precedent. Two 
Second Circuit District Courts have emphatically embraced the 
holdings of other jurisdictions and expressly held that 
corporations could be liable under the ATS.114 Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit’s position as the sole jurisdiction to hold 
corporations immune from liability under the ATS is 
significantly diminished, and largely untenable when viewed 
outside the doctrine of stare decisis. Recent decisions by other 
courts have reached the same conclusion at the district courts 
within the second circuit regarding corporate liability under the 
ATS. In the Eleventh Circuit, the court examined a plaintiffs’ 
ATS claim and held that a corporation could be held liable for 
ATS violations through the federal common law.115 Similarly, in 
William v. AES Corp.,116 the Eastern District of Virginia 
specifically held that although a plaintiff’s Alien Tort Statute 
claim failed because it did not have a sufficient nexus to the 
United States, the defendants were not immune under the 
statute merely because of their corporate status.117 In light of 
these precedents, courts are increasingly unwilling to hold a 
                                                          
110  17 F. Supp.3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014) aff’d sub nom, Sikhs for 
Justice, Inc. v. Nath, No. 14-1724-CV, 2014 WL 7232492 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2014). 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 341. 
113  Id. 
114  See Apartheid Litig., 15. F.Supp.3d at 454; Sikhs for Justice Inc., 17 
F. Supp.3d at 334. 
115  Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 584 (11th Cir. 2015). 
116  No. 1:14CV343 JCC/TRJ, 2014 WL 2896012 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2014). 
117  William v. AES Corp., 28 F.Supp.3d 553 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
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corporate defendant immune under the ATS.118  As a result, this 
analysis has demonstrated that the ATS provides a sufficient 
remedy against Company Y for engaging in inhumane and 
tortious interrogation techniques upon detainees within the 
CIA’s Interrogation and Detention Program. This analysis will 
now to turn to the jurisdictional issue under the ATS and argue 
that that Company Y is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts 
under the ATS. 
III. DISPLACING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORALITY IN KIOBEL II 
In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court held that the ATS did not 
provide an explicit grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and 
“even where [ATS] claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”119 
Notably, the court failed to articulate a precise standard to 
determine whether an ATS claim sufficiently touches and 
concerns the territory of the United States, and what conduct 
may be deemed sufficient to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.120 Indeed, the crafters of the ATS 
did not envision that corporations such as Company Y would be 
able to commit heinous violations of customary law with 
impunity and eviscerate the congressionally intended 
protections of the ATS, rendering the practical effect the statute 
gutless and hollow. As this analysis will posit, private military 
corporations may be held accountable for violations of customary 
law overseas where their actions have a sufficient nexus to the 
United States. Further, where military contractors commit 
violations of customary international law, a plaintiff may be able 
                                                          
118  E.g., Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2 F.Supp.3d 717 (D. Md. 2014) 
(examining whether the corporate defendants could be held liable under the 
ATS for aiding the Chinese government to suppress the privacy and free speech 
rights of the plaintiffs in China); id. (The Du Daobin court did not specifically 
address the status of the corporate defendants, but specifically stated, “this 
Court harbors doubt that corporations are immune under the ATS). 
119  Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (2013). 
120  Kiobel II at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (the ATS may still “reach” 
abroad); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., (concurring) (the majority’s standard “leaves 
for another day the determination of just when the presumption against 
extraterritoriality may be overcome). 
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to assert ATS jurisdiction over these corporations by 
demonstrating that some relevant conduct occurred within a 
territory of the United States. Lastly, where private military 
corporations violate international law in territories where the 
United States exercises de facto sovereignty, those actions may 
also meet the necessary jurisdictional requirements of the Kiobel 
II holding. 
A. Private Military Contractors may be held liable for 
customary law violations that occurred overseas under the 
ATS where plaintiffs are able to establish that some 
‘relevant conduct’ occurred within the United States 
A cornerstone of the Kiobel II decision is the requirement 
that ATS claims must “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.”121 However, the majority in 
Kiobel II failed to articulate any guidance on how lower courts 
should apply the “touch and concern” requirement to ATS 
claims.122 The concurring opinions sought to remedy this 
ambiguity by proposing two approaches. According to Justice 
Alito’s concurrence, an ATS claim falls outside the scope of the 
presumption—and thus is not barred by the presumption—only 
if the event or relationship that was the ‘focus’ of congressional 
concern under the relevant statute takes place within the United 
States.”123 Justice Breyer articulated a factor based approach 
that would give rise to jurisdiction under the ATS, which would 
arise when “(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the 
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s 
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important 
American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest 
in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor 
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other 
                                                          
121  Id.. 
122  Doe I v. Nestle USA Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Tymoshenko, 2013 WL 4564646, at *4 (“[T]he Court failed to provide guidance 
regarding what is necessary to satisfy the ‘touch and concern’ standard.”). 
123  Id. (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268, (2010) (holding that 
courts should look to the ‘focus’ of congressional intent when seeking to 
determine the extraterritorial reach of a statute). 
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common enemy of mankind.”124 A number of courts have applied 
these approaches and found jurisdiction under the ATS where 
plaintiffs allege extensive, substantial or specific, relevant 
domestic conduct.125 Accordingly, Company Y may be held liable 
for violations of customary law that occurred overseas under the 
ATS where a plaintiff is able to establish a sufficient nexus 
between Company Y’s interrogation techniques to a territory of 
the United States. 
A number of courts have determined that ATS claims 
against private military corporations sufficiently touch and 
concern the territory of the United States when the plaintiffs are 
able to show specific relevant domestic conduct. For instance, in 
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,126 the plaintiff was 
a detainee in Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq.127 The defendant was a U.S. corporation who provided 
civilian interrogators that committed heinous and sadistic acts 
of violence and criminal abuses against the detainees at the 
prison.128 In displacing the ATS’ presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the court found that there was extensive 
relevant conduct within a U.S. territory to warrant jurisdiction 
under the ATS. In Al Shimari, the CACI interrogators were 
themselves U.S. citizens, the interrogators were hired in the 
U.S. pursuant to a contract executed with the U.S. Department 
of Interior in Arizona, and the interrogators received security 
clearances that were issued by the U.S. Department of 
Defense.129 Furthermore, the plaintiff contended that “CACI’s 
managers located in the United States were aware of reports of 
misconduct abroad, attempted to cover up the misconduct, and 
“implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged it.”130 Accordingly, the 
Al-Shimari court found that the plaintiffs alleged extensive and 
specific conduct of the defendants that occurred within the 
territory of the U.S. to displace the presumption against 
                                                          
124  Kiobel II, at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
125  Doe v. Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 593 (11th Cir. 2015); Al 
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech. Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 2014); Mastafa 
v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). 
126  758 F.3d at 516.516, (4th Cir. 2014). 
127  Al Shimari, 758 F.3d 516 at 516. 
128  Id. at 521. 
129  Id. at 528-29. 
130  Id. 
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extraterritoriality. 
Similarly, the Second Circuit found that specific conduct 
between a defendant located in the U.S. and the perpetrators of 
human rights abuses abroad displaced the presumption against 
extraterritoriality under the ATS. In Mastafa v. Chevron 
Corp.,131 the plaintiffs alleged that defendants engineered a 
corrupt banking agreement that allowed the Saddam Hussein 
regime to circumvent international economic sanctions and that 
defendant “aided and abetted the abuses of the Saddam Hussein 
regime by paying the regime kickbacks and other unlawful 
payments, which enabled the regime to survive and perpetrate 
the abuses suffered by plaintiffs.”132 The Second Circuit found 
that the corporate defendants structured fraudulent contractual 
agreements and overtly conspired within the U.S. to evade the 
international sanctions regime against Iraq.133 Thus, the court 
determined that the overt actions, including a combination of 
carefully structured financial transactions, which occurred 
within the U.S., were sufficient to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.134 
The Eleventh Circuit also considered the Al Shimari factors 
in deciding whether the plaintiffs’ ATS claims displaced the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, but the court reached a 
different conclusion because the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional claims 
lacked specificity. In Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., the plaintiff 
brought suit against corporate defendants within the United 
States who allegedly contracted with paramilitary groups in 
Colombia to eliminate opposition to the defendants’ mining 
operations in Colombia.135  The plaintiff raised three “focus” 
arguments in addressing the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. First, the corporate defendants in the instant 
action are domiciled in the United States. Secondly, the 
paramilitary group contracted by the defendants are labeled as 
a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, thus there are 
strong national interests. Lastly, the defendants’ agreement to 
conspire, aid, abet, and fund the terrorist organization occurred 
                                                          
131  770 F.3d at 170. (2d Cir. 2014). 
132  Id. at 175. 
133  Id. at 191. 
134  Id. 
135  Drummand Co, Inc., 782 F. 3d at 580. 
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within the United States.136 In addressing the plaintiffs’ focus 
arguments, the Drummond court relied on previous circuit 
precedent to hold that “general allegations of agreement with 
and support of the AUC did not warrant displacement” of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.137 Additionally, the 
plaintiffs in Drummond failed to offer any specific allegations of 
instances where the defendants conspired with Colombian 
paramilitary forces within the United States. Accordingly, the 
Drummond court held that the plaintiffs did not proffer any 
specific, relevant domestic conduct to support their ATS 
claims.138 However, the Drummond court did not foreclose on the 
possibility that domestic financial transactions and agreements 
could serve as a basis for jurisdiction under the ATS. In fact, the 
Drummond court did find relevant the corporate citizenship of 
the defendants, the status of the paramilitary group as a 
designated terrorist organization by the U.S. government, and 
the alleged transactional conduct by the defendants.139 
B. The relationship between the CIA and its Contractors 
during the agency’s Interrogation and Detention program 
establish sufficient ‘relevant domestic conduct’ to hold the 
contractors liable for violations of customary law under the 
ATS 
Application of Al-Shimari, Drummond, and Mastafa 
framework demonstrate a viable ATS litigation strategy against 
private military contractors, such as CIA interrogators who 
utilized ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques. Through the CIA’s 
interrogation and detention program, these contractors 
committed serious human rights abuses that were clear 
violations of customary law.140 Moreover, there is significant 
“relevant domestic conduct” to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality under the ATS with regard to the CIA’s 
interrogation and detention program. The CIA engaged in 
extensive financial and contractual relations with private 
                                                          
136  Id. at 594. 
137  Id. at 596. 
138  Id. at 599; Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 195. 
139  Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d at 598-600. 
140  See generally Amnesty Int’l Report, supra note 14. 
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contractors within the interrogation and detention program.141 
The private military corporation was headquartered and 
incorporated within the United States, and at least two of the 
interrogators who designed and implemented the enhanced 
interrogation techniques held medical licenses within the 
United States.142 Lastly, corporate employees conspired with 
CIA officials within the United States to shield the true nature 
of the interrogation and detention program from public 
officials.143 These factors strongly indicate that relevant 
domestic conduct exists within the relationship between the CIA 
and its privately contracted interrogators to warrant a 
displacement of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
under the ATS. 
In 2002, the CIA contracted two psychologists to draft and 
implement ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.144 Media outlets 
and various public records have identified the two psychologists 
as Dr. James Elmer Mitchell and Dr. Bruce Jessen, both of 
whom held medical practitioners licenses within the United 
States.145 The techniques drafted and implemented by the two 
psychologists were found to be in violation of numerous 
international conventions and treaties against torture and 
inhumane treatment.146 Mitchell and Jessen incorporated a 
private military corporation (“Company Y”), within the United 
States147 and contracted with the CIA to provide interrogators 
and “operational psychologists, debriefers, and security 
personnel at CIA detention site[s].”148 By 2005, the CIA had 
                                                          
141  Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 192. 
142  Al-Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528-29. 
143  Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2013) (ATS claims 
touched and concerned the United States because plaintiffs had “presented 
evidence that . . . overt acts in furtherance of [the defendants’] conspiracy took 
place in the United States”). 
144  SSCI Report, supra note 16, at 21. 
145  U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Armed Services 
Committee Inquiry Into The Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody 1-7 
(2008) [hereinafter Senate Armed Services Report]; Petition for Judicial 
Review, Cox v. Texas State Bd. of Examiners Of Psychologists, No. D-1-GN-11-
001285, 2011 WL 1652243 (D.Tex. Apr. 29, 2011). 
146  SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Findings and Conclusions p. 3. 
147  Various reports have identified Company Y as “Mitchell, Jessen and 
Associates” a private military consulting corporation incorporated in the 
United States. Senate Armed Services Report, supra note 145 at 24. 
148  Id. at 169. 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4
4  DAVID J  SATNARINE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2016  3:53 PM 
2016] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 191 
effectively outsourced its interrogation and detention program 
to Company Y.149 Company Y received numerous payments from 
the CIA for its services, procured a five million dollar 
indemnification contract with the agency, and received 
approximately one million dollars in legal representation costs, 
which included legal services provided at a Senate Committee 
briefing.150 
Significantly, the Company Y officials designed, planned 
and executed the strategic use of torture as an enhanced 
interrogation technique within the United States, or with 
officials located within the United States, and exported those 
techniques to be utilized against detainees held in U.S. custody 
overseas. Company Y contractors created programs and 
techniques in the United States and acted in concert with the 
CIA headquarters to conceptualize and design torture 
techniques, exported these techniques to the CIA’s Black Sites, 
“personally applied them to detainees, conducted psychological 
evaluations of detainees whom they would torture, trained other 
interrogators in the use of torture, and recommended what 
techniques should be employed on which detainees.”151 The 
design and implementation of the interrogation tactics are 
similar to that of a bomb maker who manufacturers an 
improvised explosive device within the United States and then 
exports that device to be utilized in a terrorist attack overseas.152 
The corporate status of Company Y, the contractual 
relationship between the CIA and Company Y, and the overt 
                                                          
149  SSCI Report, supra note 16, Findings and Conclusions at 11. 
150  Id. 
151  Keller, Dougherty, et.al, Doing Harm: Health Professionals’ Central 
Role in the CIA Torture Program, Physicians for Human Rights, Dec. 2014 at 
5, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/ 
reports/doing-harm-health-professionals-central-role-in-the-cia-torture-
program.html; see also SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Findings and 
Conclusions p. 11. 
152  See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 309 
(D.Mass. 2013) (“Defendant’s alleged actions in planning and managing a 
campaign of repression [overseas] from the United States are analogous to a 
terrorist designing and manufacturing a bomb in this country, which he then 
mails [overseas] with the intent that it explodes there”); Mwani v. Al Qaeda, 
No. CV 99-125 (JMF), 2014 WL 4749182, at 8 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (terrorist 
attack that was plotted in part within the United States is sufficient to displace 
the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
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actions of CIA officials to shield the program from public 
scrutiny and attempts to cover up the torture of detainees within 
the Interrogation program are relevant factors in determining 
whether an ATS claim against Company Y displaces the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.153 Moreover, since 
Company Y was arguably created for the specific purpose of 
committing human rights violations overseas at the behest of a 
U.S. intelligence agency, there are significant national and 
domestic interests that warrant displacement of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.154 In instances, such as 
here, where a corporation is formed specifically within the U.S. 
for the sole purpose of effectuating illegal activity abroad, courts 
have determined that the process of domestic incorporation is 
relevant in domestic conduct to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.155 
Company Y managers were also aware of unauthorized and 
unlawful interrogation techniques that were either ignored or 
encouraged by CIA officials within the United States SSCI 
Report, Findings and Conclusions at 12. Extensive 
communication between Company Y and CIA officials 
demonstrate that CIA officials and Company Y officials were 
aware of the torture being inflicted upon detainees and 
continued to encourage the use of the illegal interrogation 
techniques.156  In one particular instance, a medical officer 
                                                          
153  Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 529 (noting that acts of torture committed by 
U.S. citizens, employed by a U.S. corporation, acting pursuant to a contract 
procured with a U.S. agency constituted relevant domestic conduct); Lively, at 
311-12 (holding that Kiobel did not bar ATS claims because some relevant 
conduct was based on activities that occurred within the United States”). 
154  SSCI Report, supra note 16, Executive Summary at p. 12 (by 2008, 
approximately 85% of the CIA’s interrogation program was staffed by the sole 
source contract procured by Company Y). 
155  Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d at 309; Mwani, 947 F.Supp.2d at 5 (where 
defendants laid criminal plans within the U.S. for the specific purpose of 
exporting those crimes abroad, those acts constitute relevant domestic 
conduct); Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct., at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (the defendant’s 
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national 
interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States 
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a 
torturer or other common enemy of mankind”). 
156  SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Executive Summary, p. 168, n. 128 
(noting extensive communication between Company Y and CIA headquarters 
within the United States); id. at Executive Summary, p. 99. 
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remarks on the aggressive waterboarding of detainees stating in 
an e-mail that “the requirements coming from home are really 
unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.’”157 Accordingly, the 
blatant disregard for the rights of the detainees through the 
continued use of enhanced interrogation techniques in spite of 
its illegality, and the tacit approval given by Company Y officials 
within the U.S. established sufficient relevant domestic 
conduct.158 
Cumulatively, the extensive entanglement between the CIA 
and Company Y to administer the Interrogation and Detention 
Program demonstrate sufficient relevant conduct to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality under the ATS. The 
corporate citizenship of Company Y, its assets, officers, and 
employees all possess significant contacts with the United 
States. Moreover, the heinous abuse and torture effectuated by 
Company Y interrogators upon detainees at CIA Black Sites 
represent the very behavior that congress intended the ATS to 
prohibit. Namely, the United States possess a moral 
responsibility to prohibit domestic corporations such as 
Company Y from committing heinous acts of torture overseas 
with perceived impunity.159 
C. The United States maintained de facto sovereignty over 
‘Black Sites’ within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention 
                                                          
157  SSCI Report, supra note 16 at Executive Summary p. 84; id. at 145 
(noting a CIA Inspector General report; stating that there is a strong argument 
that the enhanced interrogation techniques violates international and 
domestic law); U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of the Inspector 
Gen., A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Inter
rogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq xxvii, 368 
(2008)(Department of Justice report noting that Federal Bureau of 
Investigations Agents did not attempt to dissuade contractors from using 
enhanced interrogation techniques despite knowledge of its illegality because 
the policies were approved at “high levels”). 
158  Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 531 (finding relevant domestic conduct under 
the ATS where a private military corporation’s mangers “gave tacit approval 
to the acts of torture committed by . . . employees at the Abu Ghraib prison, 
attempted to ‘cover up the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not expressly, 
encouraged it”). 
159  Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, concurring) (noting that the 
United States holds a distinct interest in preventing itself “from becoming a 
safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind”). 
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Program 
In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court decided that territorial 
jurisdiction is an essential component of ATS claims.160 
However, the majority analysis’s was careful to confine 
territorial jurisdiction to “a territory of” the United States, not 
exclusively “within” the United States.161 The touch and concern 
analysis is conducted on a case-by-case basis and applied in a 
manner that “does not typically impose the sovereign will of the 
United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another sovereign.”162 As a result, application of 
the ATS is proper in cases where the underlying wrongful 
conduct occurred in territories overseas where U.S. law is 
operative (either by treaty or another method).163 Absent formal 
sovereignty, territories under the exercise and control of the 
United States are “de facto” territories of the United States. 
Accordingly, U.S. law is applicable to the de facto territories 
under the control of the United States.164 As a result, this 
analysis will demonstrate that Company Y’s illegal 
interrogation techniques occurred within de facto territories of 
                                                          
160  Id. at 1667. 
161  Id. (citing Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810-11 (wrongful seizure of slaves from 
a vessel while in port in the United States); Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 942-45 
(wrongful seizure in United States territorial waters, outside the geographic 
territory of the United States). 
162   Id. at 1667; see Foreign Relations Law-Alien Tort Statute-Fourth 
Circuit Allows Alien Tort Statute Claim Against Abu Ghraib Contractor.-al 
Shimari v. Caci Premier Technology, Inc.: Fourth Circuit Allows Alien Tort 
Statute Claim Against Abu Ghraib Contractor, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1537 
(2015) (noting a primary justification for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is to prevent conflicts between national laws). 
163  See O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908) (noting that 
the ATS applied to extraterritorial conduct because of a treaty between the 
U.S. and Spain that made U.S. law operative in Cuba during a U.S. occupation 
of the country); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850) (finding that the 
United States exercised dominion and control over the Port of Tampico, Mexico 
where “the country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United 
States, and governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the 
President”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004) (holding that the ATS may 
apply to actions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because the United States 
maintained complete jurisdiction and control over the territory as 
demonstrated by an express lease agreement). 
164  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008) (finding that the 
“United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control over the base 
[in Cuba], maintains de facto sovereignty over [Guantanamo Bay, Cuba]”). 
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the United States to give rise to jurisdiction under the ATS. 
The United States exercises practical sovereignty over 
territories within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention 
program.165 Unlike de jure sovereignty, practical sovereignty is 
a justiciable question that allows courts to examine the degree 
of control the United States exerts over a territory.166 In order to 
make this determination, courts must determine whether the 
United States, for all practical purposes, [is] answerable to no 
other sovereign for its acts” in that territory.167 This analysis 
must be done on a case-by-case basis and take into account the 
following: 1) the legal authorities for U.S. control over a 
territory; 2) the length of military occupation and whether the 
U.S. intended to displace foreign law;168 3) the inherent dangers 
of an occupied territory; and 4) the host’s nation jurisdiction and 
whether application of domestic law would “cause friction with 
a host government.”169 
It is axiomatic that U.S. maintains de facto sovereignty over 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other CIA Black Sites which 
comport with Boumediene’s practical sovereignty analysis.170 
For example, in March 2003, the United States assumed 
complete jurisdiction and sovereignty over Iraq by dethroning 
its government and serving as the principal administrator of the 
Coalition Provincial Authority (hereinafter “CPA”).171 The CPA 
                                                          
165  Id. at 754. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 769. 
168  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. 
169  Id. at 769. 
170  Id. at 755; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480; See, e.g., Judgments, Al-
Nashiri v. Poland, (Eur. Ct. H. R. Jul. 24, 2014) (Application 28761/11) 
(holding that “Poland knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities 
on its territory at the material time and that, by enabling the CIA to use its 
airspace and the airport, by its complicity in disguising the movements of 
rendition aircraft and by its provision of logistics and services, including the 
special security arrangements, the special procedure for landings, the 
transportation of the CIA teams with detainees on land, and the securing of 
the Stare Kiejkuty base for the CIA’s secret detention, Poland cooperated in 
the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and 
interrogation operations on its territory.”); Salim v. Mitchell, No. CV-15-0286-
JLQ, 2016 WL 1717185, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2016).  
171  See e.g., The Imminent Transfer of Sovereignty of Iraq: Hearing Before 
the H.Comm. on International Relations., 108th Cong. 19-20 (2004) (Statement 
of Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint 
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functioned as the government of Iraq with plenary legal and 
political power.172 Congress appropriated funds for the 
administration of the CPA and referred to Iraqi territory “as an 
entity of the U.S. Government” in the CPA’s appropriation 
bill.173 Additionally, the government of the United States 
explicitly referred to the CPA as an “instrumentality” of the 
United States.174 Significantly, the CPA effectively preempted 
Iraqi law in its territory. The CPA granted immunity to 
contractors from liability in Iraqi courts and provided that 
United States domestic law would apply to the activities of 
contractors.175 Accordingly, the underlying rationale of avoiding 
displacement of another sovereign’s domestic law did not apply 
to the territory of Iraq at that time.176 
The fundamental rationale underlying the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of the ATS did not apply to 
Afghanistan during the period where Company Y was 
conducting enhanced interrogation techniques in the country.  
                                                          
Staff) (noting that MNF-I “is subordinate to General Abizaid as Commander, 
U.S. Central Command”); U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, Pub. L. 
No.PUBLIC LAW 108-11, 108th, CONG., REP ON EMERGENCY WARTIME 
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (2003), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/legislative/150
6.pdf (The CPA exercises powers of government temporarily in order to provide 
for the effective administration of Iraq . . . The CPA is vested by the President 
with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its 
objectives . . . The CPA Administrator has primary responsibility for exercising 
this authority). 
172  See Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority 
Regulation Number 1, §1.2 (May 16, 2003) (“The CPA is vested with all 
executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its 
objectives . . .”). 
173  See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Defense and 
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, 117 Stat. 
1209, 1225, 1236 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
174  See Supplemental Brief of the United States at 2, United States ‘exex 
rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 
1:04cv199); U.S. ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 306 
(4th Cir. 2009)(holding that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
CPA could be deemed an instrumentality of the United States government). 
175  See SUHAIL NAJIM ABDULLAH AL SHIMARI, Taha Yaseen Arraq 
Rashid, Salah Hasan Nusaif Al-Ejaili, Asa'ad Hamza Hanfoosh Al-Zuba'e, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CACI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY, INC., Caci 
International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, Timothy Dugan, L-3 Services, Inc., 
Defendants., 2013 WL 5823704 (C.A.4), 34 
176  Kiobel II , 133 S.Ct, at 1665. 
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In Kiobel II, Justice Breyer strongly stressed the principles of 
comity as the underlying rationale against extraterritorial 
extension of the ATS. However, in instances where the law of a 
foreign sovereign does not apply, the rationale of the 
presumption is no longer applicable.177 Similar to Guantanamo, 
the United States exerted practical sovereignty over military 
installations in Afghanistan during the time period where 
detainees were subject to torture by Company Y. The lease 
agreement between Afghanistan and the United States 
conferred “exclusive, peaceable, undisturbed, and uninterrupted 
possession” of the Bagram Airbase.178 The United States’ control 
over the Bagram was exclusive, perpetual, and terminable or 
transferrable only in its sole discretion.179 The agreement 
further confers the United States complete control and 
jurisdiction over Bagram “. . . without any interruption 
whatsoever by the host nation or its agents.”180 Additionally, the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States 
and Afghanistan ceded core functions of Afghan sovereignty to 
the U.S.181 The practical effect of the U.S. control within 
Afghanistan during the CIA Interrogation and Detention 
program demonstrate that the U.S. maintained complete control 
                                                          
177  Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct at 1659 (Breyer, J., concurring); see Dawinder S. 
Sidhu, Shadowing the Flag: Extending the Habeas Writ Beyond Guantanamo, 
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 39, 56 (2011). 
178  Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus at Exh. 1, Exh. A to Tennison Declaration ¶ 9, al Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-1669) (offering as an exhibit to 
the Tennison Declaration, the Accommodation Consignment Agreement For 
Lands and Facilities at Bagram Airfield Between the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and the United States of America (Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter 
Bagram Lease]. 
179  Bagram Lease, at ¶ 4, 9, 12. 
180  Id. at ¶ 9. 
181  See Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-
1669); Diplomatic Note from Embassy of the United States delivered to the 
Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sep. 26, 2002) Tennison Decl., Ex. 2; 
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note, 
May 28, 2003, Tennison Decl., Ex. A [herineafter Afghan SOFA] 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/bagram-ruling-bates-
4-2-09.pdf (noting that American personnel within Afghanistan were subject 
only to U.S. criminal jurisdiction, and ceded sovereign functions to the U.S. 
government such as immigration control, customs enforcement, and 
infrastructure development). 
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over the territory, and “for all practical purposes, [was] 
answerable to no other sovereign for its acts” within the 
country.182 
Exercising jurisdiction over a de facto U.S. territory under 
the domestic laws is not without historical precedent. In O’Reilly 
De Camara v. Brooke, the Supreme Court examined a Cuban 
national’s ATS claim against a U.S. military Governor of 
Havana during the United States occupation of Cuba in the 
early twentieth century.183 The plaintiff was a sheriff in Havana 
prior to the occupation. However, during the U.S. occupation, the 
military governor revoked the property rights of the plaintiff.184 
The plaintiff brought suit for deprivation of property under the 
ATS and a U.S. treaty with Spain, which made the U.S. 
Constitution operative during Cuba’s occupation. Although the 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the Platt 
Amendment, the court implied that the plaintiff’s ATS claim fell 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States since it 
was under U.S. control at the time of the seizure.185 Moreover, 
in Rasul v. Bush,186 the petitioner was a detainee in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Rasul alleged an ATS claim, a federal 
habeas petition, and a claim for violations of his due process 
under the Administrative Procedures Act against the 
government for their actions against him as a detainee.187 
Although the plaintiff abandoned the ATS during the appeal 
process,188 the court held that the plaintiff’s federal habeas 
petition applied because the U.S. exercised “complete 
jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay.189 The Rasul 
precedent largely comport with the line of Supreme Court cases 
applying domestic law to territories under the practical 
sovereignty of the United States.190 
                                                          
182  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770. 
183  O’Reilly De Camara, 209 U.S. at 45. 
184  Id. at 49, 52. 
185  See also Alex S. Moe, A Test by Any Other Name: The Influence of 
Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 46 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 225, 238 (2014). 
186  542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004) 
187  Id. at 472. 
188  Id. at 505 n.6. 
189  Id. at 480. 
190  De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 
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Judicial decisions holding that military installations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are not under the de facto sovereignty of the 
United States are incorrectly decided. In Al Maqeleh v. Gates,191 
the court found it dispositive that the United States did not 
deem the leasehold agreement between Afghanistan and the 
United States to establish indicia of “permanence”.192 Judicial 
decisions holding the permanence factor as dispositive in 
determining practical sovereignty are at odds with the rationale 
of the Boumediene decision and incorrectly emphasize formal, 
rather than practical sovereignty considerations.193  The lease 
agreement between the United States and Cuba at issue in 
Boumediene and Rasul neither contains a provision exhibiting 
an intention of permanence of U.S. forces nor does it contain a 
provision providing for the ultimate sovereignty of the United 
States. Significantly, it is not altogether uncommon for a 
territory to be under the de jure sovereignty of one nation, while 
under the plenary control, or practical sovereignty, of 
another.”194 
Additionally, the Al Maqaleh relies on Johnson v. 
Eisentranger,195 to contend that “active theatres of war” preclude 
                                                          
U.S. 298 (1922) (extending “fundamental personal rights” to inhabitants of the 
“unincorporated” U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico, Guam and the 
Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, (1904) (The United States 
maintained complete sovereignty over these territories, and Congress governed 
the territories); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
191  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605. F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
192  Id. at 97. Other courts have reached similar conclusions based on the 
Al Maqaleh precedent, see Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(finding it dispositive that like Bagram Air Force Base, the United States has 
not established an intention of permanence in Iraq to warrant the exercise of 
de facto sovereignty); Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 571 (2010) (citing 
Al Maqaleh to hold that Iraq was not under the de facto sovereignty of the 
United States). 
193  See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (ATS may apply where U.S. exercises 
“plenary and exclusive jurisdiction,” but not “ultimate sovereignty”); 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764  (rejecting government’s “formalistic, sovereignty-
based and nothing that objective factors and practical concerns color the de 
facto sovereignty analysis); id. at 754 (relevant question is whether U.S. 
exercises “dominion or power” in “the general, colloquial sense”); see also 
Dawinder S. Sidhu, Shadowing the Flag: Extending the Habeas Writ Beyond 
Guantanamo, at 56 (2011) (questioning the issue of permanence in Al-
Maqelah). 
194  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754. 
195  Johnson v. Eisentranger, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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a finding of de facto sovereignty. However, a proper reading of 
Eisentranger does not categorically preclude extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law in military occupied territories. Instead, 
Eisentranger holds that military occupation of foreign territory 
does not mean that U.S. law “is wholly inapplicable in foreign 
territories that we occupy and govern.”196 Significantly, the Al 
Maqaleh court indicated that it would have decided differently 
had it been aware that detainees were shuffled to active theatres 
of war in order to evade domestic law.197 In the instant matter, 
there is clear evidence that CIA officials transferred detainees 
to Black Sites within Iraq and Afghanistan in order to avoid 
application of domestic law. As will be discussed further below, 
Company Y conspired with CIA officials to move detainees to 
facilities where it was perceived that application of U.S. law 
would not apply. 
D. Detainees within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention 
Program in Cuba and Afghanistan are able to bring ATS 
claims against Company Y because the enhanced 
interrogation program occurred within de facto territories of 
the United States 
A number of detainees within the CIA’s Interrogation and 
Detention program were held in territories exclusively under the 
exercise and control of the United States, or in territories that 
required acquiescence by the CIA headquarters officials.198 
Additionally, the detainees were subject to inhumane acts of 
torture by Company Y interrogators within de facto territories 
of the United States because the U.S. government exercised 
                                                          
196  Id.; United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 2012), as 
amended (Nov. 15, 2012) (rejecting the argument that “active theatres of war” 
generally preclude extraterritorial application of a U.S. statute . . .” it would 
be incongruous to conclude that statutes aimed at protecting United States 
officers and employees do not apply in areas of conflict where large numbers of 
officers and employees operate”). 
197  Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98. 
198  While this analysis will not examine whether arrangements between 
foreign sovereigns and the CIA required approval from CIA headquarters, it is 
more than plausible that approval of territorial agreements between CIA 
officials within the United States and host nations were required in order to 
effectuate the Interrogation and Detention Program in locations outside of the 
United States. 
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“complete jurisdiction and control” over the territories Company 
Y operated in.199 Unlike the Kiobel precedents, potential ATS 
claims arising from detainees subject to Company Y’s 
interrogation techniques within Iraq and Afghanistan arose 
during a time and under a legal regime in which there was 
effectively no operative law other than that of the United States. 
This factor significantly undermines the fundamental premise 
for the presumption against extraterritorial application of the 
ATS and removes any conflicts with foreign law. Notably, the 
fundamental lesson of Rasul holing is that there can be no 
prisons beyond the law. 
Beginning in 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees 
within the vicinity of military installations in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.200 After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, 
the CIA brought only six additional detainees into its custody: 
four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the 
interrogation program was operating in only one country. The 
CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on 
November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after 
April 2008.201 In 2004, the Department of Justice voiced 
concerns that the pending Supreme Court decision in Rasul v. 
Bush may allow the detainees to raise federal habeas petitions. 
In response to these concerns, the CIA transferred all 
Guantanamo Bay detainees to other detention facilities.202 
These actions indicate that the CIA sought to transfer detainees 
from the de facto sovereignty of the United States to other 
detention beyond the reach of U.S. law.203 
During the operational period of Company Y’s enhanced 
interrogation techniques, the United States maintained de facto 
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to the SSCI 
Report, Detention Site Red was presumably located in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba – during the period that Company Y 
was operating as the sole source of interrogators for the CIA.204 
                                                          
199  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480. 
200  SSCI Report, supra note 16 at 140. 
201  SSCI Report, supra note 16 Findings and Conclusions at 16. 
202  Id. at 141,151. 
203  See Boumedienne, 553 U.S. at 755; Al Maqaleh, 605. F.3d at 98. 
204  Amnesty Int’l Report, supra note 14, at 24; SSCI Report, supra note 
14, at Executive Summary p. 140 n.848. 
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Detainees who were subject to Company Y’s enhanced 
interrogation techniques at Detention Site Red were within a de 
facto territory of the United States at that time.205 
CIA detention sites in Afghanistan206 were under the 
practical sovereignty of the United States during Company Y’s 
operational period. The SSCI Report identifies Detention Site 
Orange and Detention Site Brown as facilities operated within 
Afghanistan during the period that Company Y also operated as 
the sole source contract for enhanced interrogation 
techniques.207 Detention Sites Orange and Brown were also 
operational through 2006 Company Y’s sole source contract.208 
Additionally, a number of reports have linked Detention Sites 
Brown and Orange to U.S. military installations at Bagram Air 
Base, Afghanistan.209 During this period, the United States held 
                                                          
205  SSCI Report, supra note 16, Findings and Conclusions at 16, SSIC 
Report at 140; O’Reilly De Camara, 209 U.S. at 50 (noting that the ATS applied 
to extraterritorial conduct because of a treaty between the U.S. and Spain that 
made U.S. law operative in Cuba during a U.S. occupation of the country); 
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850) (finding that the United States 
exercised dominion and control over the Port of Tampico, Mexico where “the 
country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United States, and 
governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the President”); 
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 468 (holding that the ATS may apply to actions in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because the United States maintained complete 
jurisdiction and control over the territory as demonstrated by an express lease 
agreement). 
206  Human Rights Watch, Lithuania: Reopen Investigation into Secret 
CIA Prisons, June 25, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/lithuania-
reopen-investigation-secret-cia-prisons%20; VICE NEWS, CIA Held Detainees at 
Lithuania Black Site, Investigators Claim, Jan. 16, 2015, 
https://news.vice.com/article/cia-held-detainees-at-lithuania-black-site-
investigators-claim; Diana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, 
WASH. POST, Nov 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644_pf.html 
207  Amnesty Int’l Report, supra note 16, at 24. 
208  Id. at 50; SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Executive Summary p. 96. 
209  Amy Goodman, “Worse” Than Guantanamo: U.S. Expands Secretive 
Prison Inside Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, DEMOCRACY NOW, Feb. 27, 
2006, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2006/2/27/worse_than_guantanamo_u_s_expan
ds; Tim Golden and Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak 
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/ 
international/26bagram.html? pagewanted=all; Marc Ambinder, Inside the 
Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, THE ATLANTIC, May 14, 2010, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/inside-the-secret-
interrogation-facility-at-bagra m/56678/; Alissa Rubin, Afghans Detail 
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virtually complete control of Bagram Air Force Base 
Afghanistan.210 Moreover, detainees were transferred to this 
location for the sole purpose of evading the reach of U.S. 
domestic law.211 In each of these facilities, the U.S. maintained 
de facto sovereignty due to the nature of its control over the 
territories. 
CONCLUSION 
This in-depth analysis has articulated fully the legal 
theories and obstacles governing Company Y’s legal liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute. Company Y operated in de facto 
territories of the United States when conducting enhanced 
interrogation techniques. Additionally, since corporate liability 
is a remedy under the Alien Tort Statute, Company Y may be 
held liable for its tortious interrogation tactics conducted on 
detainees within the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation 
program. 
                                                          
Detention in “Black Jail” at U.S. Base, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/11/29/world/asia/29bagram.html?pagewanted=all. 
210  Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850) (finding that the United 
States exercised dominion and control over the Port of Tampico, Mexico where 
“the country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United States, and 
governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the President”); 
see also  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 390 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 605 F.3d 84 (2010);  See 
also, Wahid v. Gates, 876 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2012) (analyzing then 
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy statements regarding the 
intent of the U.S. to maintain control over Bagram indefinitely and finding 
that the U.S. maintained control over Bagram currently, but there is no 
conclusive evidence that it intended to do so indefinitely).  
 
211  Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98 (purposeful movement of detainees to 
evade the reach of domestic law is a relevant factor in determining whether 
practical sovereignty exists). 
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